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বইপ্রস্থ ৮

মাসুদ করিম

আমি সাধারণত ভ্রমণকাহিনি পড়ি না। কিন্তু কখনো কখনো এমন ভ্রমণকাহিনি হাতে পড়ে তা শুধু না পড়ে থাকা যায় না তা নয় একেবারে শেষ না করে ওঠা যায় না। [...]

পুরনো বইপ্রস্থ

বইপ্রস্থ ২৫ আগস্ট ২০০৯
বইপ্রস্থ ০৮ ফেব্রুয়ারি ২০১০
বইপ্রস্থ ১৭ সেপ্টেম্বর ২০১০
বইপ্রস্থ ২৬ জুন ২০১২
বইপ্রস্থ ২৩ এপ্রিল ২০১৩
বইপ্রস্থ ১৮ নভেম্বর ২০১৩
বইপ্রস্থ ১১ মে ২০১৪

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আমি সাধারণত ভ্রমণকাহিনি পড়ি না। কিন্তু কখনো কখনো এমন ভ্রমণকাহিনি হাতে পড়ে তা শুধু না পড়ে থাকা যায় না তা নয় একেবারে শেষ না করে ওঠা যায় না। আমার হাতে এরকম যেকয়েকটা হাতে গোনা ভ্রমণকাহিনি পড়েছে এবং আমাকে তা দ্রুত পড়ে শেষ করতে হয়েছে, সেবইগুলোর মধ্যে একটা মিল আছে – আমি দেখেছি ইতিহাস রাজনীতি অর্থনীতি যখন হয় কোনো ভ্রমণকাহিনির অন্তর্লীন প্রবাহ তখনই আমার কাছে সেভ্রমণকাহিনির টান হয়ে ওঠে অপ্রতিরোধ্য। গত সপ্তাহটা তাই আমি থান্ট মাইইনট-ইউ এর এই ৩৩৩ পৃষ্টার বইটাতেই প্রোথিত ছিলাম। বলা চলে বার্মার ইতিহাস রাজনীতি অর্থনীতির ২১০০/২২০০ বছরে প্রচলের মধ্যে জড়িত হয়ে পড়েছিলাম যার মূল কথা হয়ে উঠেছে এটাই, হাজার হাজার বছর ধরে কীকরে একটা অঞ্চল এরকম বিচ্ছিন্ন বস্তু হয়ে বিন্যস্ত হয়ে থাকতে পারে।

বার্মা কেন খিড়কি হয়েছিল, তিব্বত সিচুয়ান ইউনানের খিড়কি হয়ে থাকার নিয়তি তাকে কেন বরণ করতে হয়েছিল – এ কেমন বস্তু যার অস্তিত্ব সর্বক্ষণ পর্যালোচিত কিন্তু যাকে উন্মুক্ত করার কোনো প্রয়োজন নেই বলে সে চিরদিনের জন্যই আবদ্ধ। বার্মা আসাম পর্যন্ত তার দখলে নিয়েছিল আবার যখন আসাম হারাতে হল তখন হারাল – ইস্টইন্ডিয়া কোম্পানির আয়ত্তে স্কটিশরা আমাদের বাঙালিরা বড়ব্যবসা ছোটব্যবসা শিক্ষকতা ওকালতি ডাক্তারি সবই করল আবার একসময় তাদের যখন তাড়িয়ে দেয়া হল তারা চলে এল বার্মাতেই বার্মা শক্তিশালী হল – জাপানিরা চীনের বিরুদ্ধে বার্মা পর্যন্ত নিজেদের বিস্তারিত করেছিল কিন্তু যখন জাপানিদের হটে যেতে হল তখন বার্মা তো বার্মাতেই পড়ে রইল – বার্মা স্বাধীন হল, বার্মা কমিউনিস্ট হবে ভাবল, বার্মা সামরিক বাহিনির হয়ে গেল, বার্মায় গৃহযুদ্ধ চলল, বার্মায় বাণিজ্য নিষেধাজ্ঞা চলতে লাগল, বার্মায় গণতন্ত্রের আহবান এলো গণতন্ত্র গৃহবন্দী এলো, গৃহবন্দীত্ব কাটতেও চলল – কিন্তু বার্মার খিড়কি দশা কি কাটবে? বার্মার সাধারণ মানুষের জীবন কী শেষ পর্যন্ত পাবে জীবনমানের প্রসারের কাঙ্ক্ষিত গতি? বার্মা নদীসমুদ্রের দেশ হয়েও হয়ে থাকল আবদ্ধভুমি, এই শতকে বার্মার কি ঘটবে সেই মুক্তি যাতে বার্মা আর খিড়কি হয়ে থাকবে না হয়ে উঠবে ইউনানের সিচুয়ানের তিব্বতের মুক্তির দুয়ার? এবং সেটাই ঘটাবে চীন সেটাই চাইবে ভারত?

একটা কথা ঠিক, বার্মা সামনেই এগুবে এবার, আর আবদ্ধ থাকবে না বার্মা, কিন্তু সেটা শেষ পর্যন্ত বার্মাকেই করতে হবে, চীন কী ঘটাবে ভারত কী চাইবে তা নয় বার্মা কী করবে তাই গড়বে বার্মার ভবিষ্যত।

আপনারা লক্ষ্য করে থাকবেন আমি আরাকানের কথা বলিনি রোহিঙ্গার কথা বলিনি বাংলাদেশের কথা বলিনি – কিন্তু আমি বলতে চেয়েছিলাম, বলতে পারছি না কারণ লেখক বাংলাদেশের কথা শেখ হাসিনার কথা যৎসামনান্য বললেও আরাকানের কথা রোহিঙ্গার কথা একদম বলেননি – কেন বললেন না? আরাকান সেই বার্মা নয় যেবার্মা রেঙ্গুন যেবার্মা মান্ডালায় যেবার্মা শান যেবার্মা কাচিন – আরাকান সেই বার্মা নয় যেবার্মা বর্মন তিব্বতি-বর্মন : সেটা অবশ্য ঠিক আরাকান তো রাখাইনদের আরাকান তো রোহিঙ্গাদের এবং আরাকান কথনোই খিড়কি ছিল না, আরাকান খিড়কির অধিকৃত ভূমি, খিড়কির অধিকৃত ভূমির প্রতি বার্মার আচরণ অধিকৃত ভূমির প্রতি সাধারণত নিষ্ঠুর আচরণের মতোই হবে।

আবার যেহেতু ভ্রমণকাহিনি যেহেতু তিনি আরাকান বাংলাদেশ ভ্রমণ করেননি তাই আরাকান বাংলাদেশের কথা লেখেননি, সেক্ষেত্রে কৌতুহল হতে পারে তিনি আরাকান বাংলাদেশ ভ্রমণ করলেন না কেন।

যাই হোক আমি এখনো পর্যন্ত বার্মা নিয়ে এর চেয়ে ভাল কিছু পড়িনি – কাজেই আর কথা বাড়াব না, বার্মার ভবিষ্যতের কথা ভেবে বইটি পড়ে ফেলুন তাতে অনেকের চেয়ে ভবিষ্যতে আপনি বার্মা সম্বন্ধে বেশি জানবেন কারণ বইটি খুবই সুলিখিত এবং কে না জানে একটি সুলিখিত বইয়ের মতো আর কিছুই আপনাকে বেশি জানতে সহায়তা করতে পারে না।

বইটি থেকে আমি কোনো উদ্ধৃতি ব্যবহার করলাম না, কিন্তু বইটিতে ব্যবহৃত চারটি অমূল্য মানচিত্র এখানে তুলে দিলাম। এমানচিত্রগুলো আমার মনে হয় ‘শুরুয়াত’এর কাজ করবে, ‘বন আপেতি’ বার্মা এন্ড দি ক্রসরোড অফ এশিয়া ‘বন আপেতি’ থান্ট মাইইনট-ইউ।

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মাসুদ করিম

লেখক। যদিও তার মৃত্যু হয়েছে। পাঠক। যেহেতু সে পুনর্জন্ম ঘটাতে পারে। সমালোচক। কারণ জীবন ধারন তাই করে তোলে আমাদের। আমার টুইট অনুসরণ করুন, আমার টুইট আমাকে বুঝতে অবদান রাখে। নিচের আইকনগুলো দিতে পারে আমার সাথে যোগাযোগের, আমাকে পাঠের ও আমাকে অনুসরণের একগুচ্ছ মাধ্যম।

১১ comments

  1. Pingback: বার্মাবস্তু | প্রাত্যহিক পাঠ

  2. মাসুদ করিম - ৭ নভেম্বর ২০১৫ (৯:৫২ পূর্বাহ্ণ)

  3. মাসুদ করিম - ১১ নভেম্বর ২০১৫ (১০:৩৬ পূর্বাহ্ণ)

    Myanmar’s election is a first step on a hard road

    On the streets of Yangon on Sunday, you could have been forgiven for thinking democracy was just around the corner. In my downtown neighbourhood, families of all faiths and many ethnic backgrounds queued happily from 6am to vote. There have been few allegations of fraud. Senior figures from the current administration, most former generals, have begun gracefully to admit defeat.

    The result looks certain to be a victory for The National League for Democracy, headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, longtime opposition leader. The apparent scale of that victory is staggering. The party may well win a clear majority of seats, even accounting for the 25 per cent automatically allocated to the military.

    Elections, though, are just the beginning. Next comes an arcane process unique to Myanmar’s hybrid constitution. The new, partially elected parliament will sit for the first time in January and will chose an electoral college, which in turn will select three vice-presidents, one of whom will be picked by parliament as the next president.

    Ms Suu Kyi is herself barred from the role, although an NLD majority means she will in effect control this process. But not all the levers of power are up for grabs. The military will control one vice-presidency and three government ministries, including the formidable home ministry, which runs both the police and local administration.

    Such a byzantine constitutional set-up is far from democratic but it is the arrangement that, by protecting core military interests, allowed the initial shift away from pure dictatorship five years ago. This delicate moment may turn out to be a decisive step towards democracy. Or it may further consolidate a quasi-military system.

    Several of the ministers who have lost their seats are the very ones who made possible the positive changes of the past few years. Ethnic minority parties have not fared well in the polls. Ms Suu Kyi has spoken often about national reconciliation. The international community should echo these calls.

    It is when the government takes office that the really tough work will begin. There is the peace process between the government and nearly two dozen ethnic armed organisations. Along the Myanmar-China border are hundreds more small militias, as well as criminal networks linked to lucrative mining, logging and narcotics operations.

    And then there is the economy. As much as it was a rejection of authoritarian rule, millions also voted for the NLD in the hope that their lives — today without electricity, running water or access to healthcare — may soon get better. Expectations are high.

    The downturn in Chinese commodity prices will be tough on Myanmar. Dealing with issues such as land reform, in­creasing the power supply and rebuilding the shattered judiciary will be vital to attracting foreign investment.

    The need is not just for new policies but also for an overhaul of institutions. Even dedicated reformers in the current administration, who know existing bureaucracies well, have found it hard to overcome inertia and vested interests. The international community can provide help for institutional reform and encourage the kind of responsible investment that can create jobs fast.

    Economic development will not cement the democratic transition. But it’s hard to imagine any strengthening of democratic change without parallel improvements in people’s well being.

    This long isolated and impoverished country at the heart of Asia could before long become a driver of regional growth. Even more importantly, Myanmar may offer the world an example of peaceful transition from authoritarianism. The nation’s success could resonate far beyond its borders.

    http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/dcda84fc-879e-11e5-90de-f44762bf9896.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3r84LFzku

  4. মাসুদ করিম - ১২ নভেম্বর ২০১৫ (১১:৩৭ পূর্বাহ্ণ)

    The NLD and a new dawn for old business

    As many of Myanmar’s most powerful tycoons are voted out of government, a sea change for business seems under way, but experts warn the National League for Democracy will struggle to dismantle the deep rooted business interests of the old elite.

    The past few days have been filled with casualties, as moguls hoping to re-take their seats in Nay Pyi Taw are expelled in favour of new faces.

    Some of the biggest names in business under the former regime – Yuzana Company’s U Htay Myint, Zaykabar’s U Khin Shwe, U Yan Win of A1 Group of Companies and U Tint Hsan of ACE Construction – to name a few – appear to have found themselves on the losing end of the vote.

    They had risen to the top on the coattails of concessions from the military, dominating sectors such as real estate, agriculture and mining. As a result, many found themselves in conflict with villagers in their constituencies over the past few years, which may have lost them some support.

    However, despite this recent setback, many businesspeople will have no intention of giving up their power, said Mike Davis of Global Witness.

    “Being out of parliament will certainly be a blow to these tycoons’ prestige. But they did not depend on their parliamentary seats to obtain concessions and kick people off their land,” he said.

    “It is now likely that they will work overtime to curry favour with the new rulers and make sure that when the dust has settled, they are still very much in the game.”

    In the meantime, savvy businesspeople such as U Tay Za and U Zaw Zaw have been quietly hedging their bets, reportedly donating large sums to the opposition party’s humanitarian programs.

    NLD spokesperson U Han Tha Myint confirmed the party has received financial contributions from individuals, though declined to name names.

    “We plan to announce a list of our donors at some point, but for now we are keeping the names quite confidential,” he said, adding that most of the biggest contributors are not high-profile businesspeople.

    Others have spoken out to distance themselves from government – spokespeople for Kanbawza Group and Asia World said last week they were politically neutral – though the odd slip-up shows not everyone is as impartial as they claim.

    The question now is whether democracy – or something close to one – means a new set of rules for the top businesses. Mr Davis believes it does.

    “Some may experience the new political climate much as the dinosaurs did the Ice Age. Those that snaffled plum contracts based entirely on old connections may not be able to evolve,” he said.

    “But those that are more adept at presenting a polished public persona could well thrive. The new government – whoever leads it – will not want to alienate the entire business community and some cronies could successfully adapt.”

    For U Maung Maung Lay, vice chair of the UMFCCI, the country’s top businesses had expected the NLD to win the election and had prepared themselves. “The paradigm will definitely change – expect a level playing field that will depart from crony capitalism,” he said.

    However, he warned of the scope of the challenges. “High expectations befall the NLD. Hopefully the boat will not capsize.”

    Assuming the NLD wins the election outright, the real test is how its leaders deal with corruption and cronyism, said Mark Farmaner of Burma Campaign UK.

    “In opposition, a culture of secrecy within the NLD and democracy movement developed for perfectly good reasons, it was vital for security and staying out of prison,” he said.

    “But if that culture continues into government, it could be very dangerous and allow the kind of corrupt practices of the past to continue.”

    The NLD has not yet put forward specific policies to regulate companies and the management of natural resources, he said.

    In its election manifesto, the party promises that if voted into power it will take “effective action as necessary to establish a society free of corruption”.

    It pledges to eradicate what it terms the monopolistic management and unfair distribution and usage of natural resources. “We will work to ensure that extractive projects are planned transparently and that the public is informed,” it says.

    “We will [also] establish a dedicated fund to ensure that the profits of such projects are used for the long-term development of the country.”

    If the new government really wants to change its political economic course away from “a monopolistic predatory business environment”, it will need to take to the law books and summon all its political will, said Kevin Woods, PhD candidate at University of California, Berkeley and an expert on resource politics in Myanmar.

    A balance will be hard to strike. The people of Myanmar this week are not just celebrating the NLD winning so many seats, he said. The celebration is symbolic of the changes that the people are expecting.

    “For one, kicking cronies out of the economy and bringing in investments that benefits the country and its people,” he said.

    For Mr Woods, an NLD-led government may well associate with old and new cronies. The hardest hurdle to surmount, he said, will be finding clean capital to invest that does not just run to foreign investors.

    “The military created a playing field where only cronies got the chance to play, which has now left little other choices for domestic ‘clean capital’ sources,” he said.

    “Perhaps the NLD will be confronted with this conundrum: take crony capital or have few other options to jump start the domestic economy.”

    Foreign investors still largely want to exploit natural resources or cheap labour, he said.

    “There is much concern that while the NLD may usher in welcomed political changes in the country, foreign investment from every corner of the globe will get the green light to rush into Myanmar,” he said.

    “That will spell a different type of doom to the country.”

    The manifesto deals with this briefly. “In order to encourage greater foreign investment in line with the highest international standards, we will lay down paths for economic cooperation that can bring sustainable long term mutual benefits for both parties,” it says.

    Yet Mr Woods remains concerned that natural resources are predominantly located in ethnic conflict areas, some of which are still at war against the Myanmar military.

    “A renewed rush of extraction, on the heels of the national ceasefire agreement could spark renewed violent conflict, as resource rights is one of the ingredients the armed conflict has been about in the first place,” he said.

    “We have every reason to be very cautious about how economic reforms should proceed.”

  5. মাসুদ করিম - ১২ নভেম্বর ২০১৫ (৬:২৯ অপরাহ্ণ)

    Don’t move closer to US, China paper warns Myanmar

    A Chinese Communist Party-linked newspaper has warned Myanmar not to leave China’s embrace for the United States, as opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s party was slated to wrest power from the military-backed government.

    Beijing was Yangon’s closest ally during the later years of military rule, providing a shield from international opprobrium and a lifeline as a trading partner for the junta.

    But China’s extraction of raw materials spurred popular anger across Myanmar, and Ms Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy have vowed to better represent the will of the people.

    As Myanmar’s quasi-civilian government has moved towards open elections and worked to improve relations with Western countries, ties with China have moved “from special to normal”, the Global Times said in an editorial.

    Moving closer to the US would be “a witless move (that) would ruin the strategic space and resources it can obtain from China’s amicable policies”, the editorial said.

    “China has been strategically magnanimous and kind.”

    Observers say the scale of interests China accrued in Myanmar during military rule, mainly in natural resources, added to internal tensions.

    But in June, Beijing hosted Ms Suu Kyi in a sign that key players in both nations are keen on tying down future relations.

    One of Myanmar President Thein Sein’s first major acts after assuming power in 2011 was to halt construction of the huge Chinese-backed Myitsone dam. In an apparent reference to the project in Kachin state, the editorial said “the disruption of large programmes between the two sides does not serve Myanmar’s interests”.

    Power shift won’t hurt Sino-Myanmese ties
    from Global Times editorial

    Myanmar’s ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) conceded defeat Monday in the country’s general election and the opposition National League of Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, claimed it had won more than 70 percent of the seats being contested in the parliament. It will take a few days before the final results are officially released, but the NLD is slated to win and Myanmar will witness a milestone shift of political parties.

    Such shifts used to be accompanied with difficulties and risks in the country with a flaccid economy and an influential military. It’s laudable that the USDP and military have responded to the opposition’s likely victory calmly, but what’s more complicated is to gain coordination from the national system.

    There is also a focus on possible adjustments to Myanmar’s foreign policy, particularly its relations with China. The Sino-Myanmese relationship has seen a swing in recent years from tilting toward China to a middle point between China and the West. Myanmar can continue to fine-tune the position, yet its strategic significance will be framed.

    No observer deems that Myanmar will completely tilt toward the US as such a witless move would ruin the strategic space and resources it can obtain from China’s amicable policies. Some analysts even predict some backswing in China-Myanmar relationship. The disruption of large programs between the two sides does not serve Myanmar’s interests. The NLD is more persuasive to the public than the current regime and Suu Kyi has never publicly spoken ill of these large projects, which partly prepares the two countries to resume cooperation on the large projects.

    During the transition of bilateral ties from special to normal, China has been strategically magnanimous and kind. It neither finds fault with Myanmar nor obstructs its other diplomatic options. Keeping a friendly and cooperative relationship with China serves the long-term national interests of Myanmar. Why should Myanmar limit its choice to the US only?

    Myanmar aligning with the US is conceived by some people from the ideological perspective, but national interests are diverse and overlapping. Myanmar will only seek to maximize its national interests rather than make strategic sacrifices to court China or the US. In her June visit to China, Suu Kyi already sent signals as to what attitudes Myanmar will hold toward China.

    In these globalized times, powers’ spheres of influence are diluted. Some Latin American countries in the US backyard have become important partners for China. Similarly, China won’t deem it unusual that Myanmar develops its ties with the US. Maintaining friendly and cooperative ties with China will be a rational choice for all its neighboring countries. China should have full confidence in this respect and not be hoodwinked by Western opinion.

  6. মাসুদ করিম - ১২ নভেম্বর ২০১৫ (৬:৩১ অপরাহ্ণ)

  7. মাসুদ করিম - ৩১ জানুয়ারি ২০১৬ (১১:০৬ পূর্বাহ্ণ)

    Who could be Myanmar’s next president?

    …
    6. Dr Thant Myint-U, 49

    A historian and adviser to President Thein Sein, Dr Thant Myint-U is a grandchild of United Nations Secretary-General U Thant.

    He was named one of the “100 Leading Global Thinkers” of 2013 by the Foreign Policy Magazine, and labelled one of 50 “World Thinkers” by Prospect Magazine of 2014.

    …

  8. মাসুদ করিম - ৩১ জানুয়ারি ২০১৬ (১১:১৪ পূর্বাহ্ণ)

    Why Burma Must Reset Its Relationship With China

    Paradoxical as it may sound, Burma’s democratic transition cannot succeed without Beijing.

    Burma is experiencing its most dramatic moment of political change in more than half a century. In November, the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory in parliamentary elections that were the freest and fairest in decades. A new government led by Nobel laureate and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi is about to take office. This will represent a remarkable departure from sixty years of authoritarian rule, even though the transition is taking place under a constitution that reserves key powers for Burma’s armed forces, which have ruled the country for decades. The coming months and years will be a critical time for Burma’s still-tentative democratic opening.

    Over the past several years, the international media has, quite understandably, focused on Burma’s remarkable liberalization and its opening to the West. By contrast, the country’s relationship with China has received relatively little attention. This is unfortunate.

    The rise of China is reshaping the world, and nowhere else will its impact be felt more strongly than in neighboring Burma.

    The incoming government will have two key priorities: developing Burma’s economy and ending its seven-decade-long civil war. Achieving these goals is essential to securing a sustainable democratic transition — and China has a big role to play on both fronts. Despite Burma’s opening to the West, China is still far and away its most important trading partner, and its outsized influence in the territories along Burma’s northern periphery makes it a crucial player in any peace process.

    The potential upside of the relationship is even more important. Burma is one of Asia’s poorest countries — but it sits at the continent’s heart, at the intersection of China, India, and Southeast Asia. Burma’s leaders have a unique opportunity to harness this special geography to the benefit of its people. But this will require moving away from the country’s defensive approach to China and determining how to make the best possible use of the relationship.

    Burma’s history with China is complex and troubled, and simply trying to muddle through will not be enough. Instead, the incoming government should embark on a fundamental reset of the two countries’ relationship, placing the interests of the Burmese people front and center while accommodating China’s strategic priorities.

    This will not be easy. Though nurturing friendly relations with Beijing has long been a core tenet of their foreign policy, Burma’s rulers have also sometimes viewed China as a possible menace. In the late 1960s, communist insurgents armed by China crossed the border and established a “liberated zone” in Burma’s northeast. In 1989, the insurgency collapsed — but China’s links with various ethnic militias remain, most notably with the 25,000-strong United Wa State Army.

    In 2011, the relationship veered into choppy waters. One of the first acts of President Thein Sein’s reformist administration was to suspend work on the controversial $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam, a Chinese project meant to supply electricity to its Yunnan province, which borders Burma. Beijing was not pleased. Later that year, fierce fighting erupted in the far north between Burma’s army and the Kachin Independence Army for the first time in nearly two decades, sending thousands of refugees and stray artillery fire into China. In 2012, protests broke out against a big Chinese-operated copper mine. Investment pledges from mainland Chinese companies, estimated at $8.2 billion in 2010-11, shriveled to under $100 million in 2013-4.

    Perhaps unsurprisingly, Burmese public opinion on China has soured considerably over the last quarter-century. Regime cronies and elites within some of the ethnic militias have grown rich from doing business with Yunnan. But many Burmese blame China’s hydropower, mining and agricultural projects for fueling corruption, displacing rural communities, and wrecking the environment. Along with weak state institutions and western sanctions, the impunity enjoyed by Chinese business interests has been an important element of the crony capitalism that drives Burma’s rent-based political economy.

    A year ago, a freshly recruited and heavily armed ethnic Chinese Kokang militia crossed into Burma from Yunnan and overran the frontier town of Laogai. Burma’s army responded with a sustained counterattack that enjoyed enthusiastic public support. In February 2015, a top general alleged that the Kokang militia included former Chinese soldiers, something Beijing vociferously denied. In March, when the Burmese air force launched air strikes against the Kokang, some of the bombs accidentally fell on Chinese territory.

    All this took place at a time when Burma’s government was putting the finishing touches on a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with over a dozen ethnic militias, meant to be the crowning legacy of the incumbent administration. After none of the armed groups along the Chinese border signed the accord, a senior Burmese negotiator publicly criticized China for urging them not to do so.

    China, too, has had its concerns. In particular, Beijing has become quite nervous about Burma’s growing ties with the United States. In a way, the Burmese government has been doing exactly what the Chinese have long advised: reforming itself, repairing its relationships with the West, getting sanctions lifted, and reducing its dependence on China’s support in the U.N. Security Council. But Beijing was unprepared for the speed of the transformation, the eagerness with which Burma’s ex-generals sought to “rebalance” their foreign policy towards the West, and the anti-China mood that quickly filled the country’s newly open political space.

    Chinese leaders are now waiting to see how the new government led by Aung San Suu Kyi shapes up. Beijing resolutely supported Burma’s previous military regime for over two decades, and worries that the shift in administration to Aung San Suu Kyi’s government will result in a surge of Western influence. But the Chinese seem to have realized which way the wind is blowing. In early 2014, Aung San Suu Kyi traveled to China for the first time, where she met with Xi Jinping himself and repeatedly stressed that she welcomes a good relationship with Beijing.

    Now is the right time for Burma to reset its engagement with its giant neighbor. This new relationship could take many forms, but should include three important components. First, rather than letting China take the lead, Burma should formulate its own comprehensive plan for the multi-billion dollar infrastructure development it needs to revitalize its economy. China should be invited and encouraged to play a major role, but only within a framework set by the Burmese government in close consultation with the affected communities.

    Second, Burma’s leaders must recognize that development cannot proceed at the expense of peace. The controversy surrounding the Myitsone Dam, for example, is not simply a debate about economics — it is intimately linked to finding lasting solutions to the conflict in the Kachin State. With good reason, local communities fear that Chinese projects will destroy their homes and livelihoods. The future government will need to consider development in ethnic minority areas together with sensitive political issues, such as business interests tied to ethnic militias, or the army’s confiscation of land.

    Third, Burma’s peace process should be an arena for global cooperation, not pointless competition. China has become increasingly anxious over what it sees as undue Western and Japanese influence over the Burmese peace process, which has consequences for the future of the Chinese-Burmese border. The needs — from landmine clearance to ceasefire monitoring — are great, but they should be met transparently, perhaps through a new mechanism linked to the United Nations in which China, too, can participate.

    Will Burma be able to convince Beijing to a new beginning of the two countries’ relationship? The Chinese will be tempted to push their economic interests and see how far they can get, using their influence over the borderlands as leverage. And they may withhold any decisive support for Burma’s peace process until they see their neighbor address their anxieties about Western influence and move quickly on stalled business projects.

    This would be a mistake, igniting a strong nationalist reaction from across Burma’s political spectrum. But it would also be a mistake for Burma’s new government to consider each Chinese demand in isolation, while expecting more help with the peace process. Instead, the two sides must craft a comprehensive and forward-thinking new vision for their relationship.

    There are, indeed, things China wants from Burma — and Burma can use these to its advantage. The economic growth of China’s Yunnan province depends on Burma, which is an important consumer market and has for nearly two decades provided a vital supply of primary commodities. Recently completed oil and gas pipelines and hydropower projects in Burma are essential to satisfying the energy needs of Yunnan and China’s wider southwest.

    Burma’s position as a land bridge to India and the Indian Ocean is also vital. The “One Belt One Road” transport scheme is Xi Jinping’s signature initiative, and Burma is a lynchpin. China would like a new railway line connecting its interior to a deep-sea port on the Bay of Bengal, highways extended to India, and the Irrawaddy River transformed into a waterway for Chinese freight headed west. All these projects depend on Burmese cooperation.

    Finally, Burma occupies an important place in the growing global competition between China and the United States. China is happy to see a peaceful Burma opening up and engaging with the West, as long as this does not lead to even a shadow of a western military presence along the two countries’ 1,300-mile-long frontier.

    It is important for Burma’s international friends to appreciate its delicate situation with Beijing and give it the space it needs. Burma should have the best possible relations with all countries, but in ways that benefit the Burmese people. Sound Sino-Burmese ties are in the interests of everyone, including the United States. It’s time for both Burmese and Chinese leaders to recognize the need for a reset and to start making it happen.

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