The so-called July 2024 “Colour Revolution” in Bangladesh, which led to the collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s long-standing government and the formation of an interim government, has been widely celebrated as a democratic breakthrough. Yet, from the perspectives of Immanuel Kant, Max Weber, and several contemporary theorists, this revolution raises serious questions about its philosophical and sociological legitimacy. This came to my attention while talking with another author Jahanara Nuri, who has already published an article on this platform after Yunus announced a “July Charter” at the anniversary of the so-called “revolution”. 

We must admit that what happened in July – August 2024 is not a “revolution”. However, the National Citizens Party (NCP), Bangladesh Jamat-e-Islami (BJI) and its students’ wing Islami Chatra Shibir (ICS), and other Islamist right wing political parties are claiming it as “revolution”, while Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and left-wing political parties are claiming it as “mass uprising” or “resurgence”. The Bangladesh Awami League and its allies are claiming it as a “coup”, since it is a part of a “meticulous design” as Yunus and his team claimed it. After having this conversation with Jahanara Nuri, I understood that there is a necessity to explain why philosophically this is not a “revolution”. Hence, in this article I have discussed Kant and Weber’s philosophies to explain why this is not a revolution and why the government lacks the legitimacy to declare this July Charter.   

Kant: Revolution Is Morally Impermissible 

Immanuel Kant’s political philosophy is grounded in legalism and moral duty. In his Doctrine of Right, part of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant categorically states:  

“There is… no right to sedition, still less to rebellion, and least of all is there a right against the head of a state… to attack his person or even his life on the pretext that he has abused his authority.” 

Kant’s rejection of revolution stems from his belief that law is the condition of freedom. Even unjust governments must be challenged within the bounds of law, because revolution undermines the very legal framework that secures civil liberty. 

In Perpetual Peace, Kant further argues that peace must be pursued through lawful reform, not upheaval, and that no state has the right to interfere with the constitution of another. The “Colour Revolution” in Bangladesh, due to its terrorizing and destructive nature, involved the collapse of constitutional order, the storming of government buildings, killing of police officials, torture and killing of religious and ethnic minorities, mob attacks, forcing teachers, admin officers and police officers to resign, spreading misinformation, disinformation and hatred on social media, rise of crimes against women and journalists, filing mass cases targeting anyone who believed in the high ideals of 1971 war of liberation, demolition of thousands of statutes related to the history, and the installation of an unelected interim regime—all of which Kant would deem morally impermissible. 

Weber and Fehér: Legitimacy Requires Institutionalization and Durability 

Max Weber’s theory of legitimacy, articulated in Economy and Society, defines authority as legitimate only when it is believed to be rightful by those who obey it. He identifies three types of legitimate authority: 

• Traditional (based on customs), 

• Charismatic (based on personal appeal), 

• Legal-rational (based on laws and procedures). 

The Hasina government, despite its authoritarian tendencies, operated within a legal-rational framework. The Colour Revolution disrupted this framework without immediately replacing it with a new institutional order. The interim government, led by Muhammad Yunus and backed by the military, lacks constitutional grounding and relies on charismatic appeal and popular sentiment, which Weber warned are unstable unless routinized into legal structures. 

Ferenc Fehér, in his analysis of Weber’s theory, adds a critical dimension:  

“Legitimate rule must be lasting, or else there is not sufficient time for those ruled to internalize obedience… revolution must in all cases be regarded as a problematic disruption of legitimacy or as a cataclysm of nature.” 

Fehér’s interpretation reinforces the idea that legitimacy is not merely about popular support or moral outrage. It requires durability, institutional separation from civil society, and internalized obedience—none of which the interim government has yet achieved. 

 Contemporary Philosophers: Legitimacy Must Be Legal and Reasoned 

Contemporary thinkers echo Kant and Weber’s caution against revolutionary legitimacy. Hans Kelsen’s legal theory insists that only norms grounded in a valid constitutional order can be legitimate. The interim regime, lacking constitutional basis, fails this test. Carl Schmitt warns that sovereign decisions made outside the law, such as those by Bangladesh’s interim regime, risk authoritarian drift. Benno Netelenbos and Thomas Fossen argue that legitimacy must be earned through public reasoning and institutional coordination—not just mass sentiment.  

These perspectives reinforce the view that the Colour Revolution, while emotionally resonant, lacks the philosophical grounding to be considered a legitimate transformation of authority. 

 Addressing Counterarguments 

Counterargument 1: The Hasina government was authoritarian and illegitimate. 

Rebuttal: Kant would argue that even unjust governments must be reformed through lawful means. Weber and Fehér would note that loss of legitimacy by one regime does not automatically confer legitimacy on its successor. 

Counterargument 2: The revolution was peaceful and supported by the majority. 

Rebuttal: Kant’s ethics prioritize law over popularity. Majority support does not justify violating constitutional order. Weber emphasizes belief in legal authority, not mere popularity or effectiveness. It is pertinent to mention that the present regime is spreading its one-sided story and suppressing the real facts.  

Counterargument 3: The interim government is transitional and aims to restore democracy. 

Rebuttal: Intentions do not confer legitimacy. Weber insists on institutionalization—the interim regime must hold elections, restore constitutional order, and gain legal-rational legitimacy. Until then, it remains a temporary authority, not a legitimate one. 

 Conclusion 

The Colour Revolution’s philosophical legitimacy requires more than moral outrage and mass mobilization. Kant would condemn it as a violation of lawful duty. Weber and Fehér would critique its failure to establish a stable, institutionalized authority. Contemporary theorists like Kelsen, Schmitt, Netelenbos, and Fossen further reinforce that legitimacy must be legal, reasoned, and institutionalized. If Bangladesh is to move forward, it must do so not through revolution, but through all-inclusive democratic elections, and the restoration of legal-rational legitimacy. In conclusion, we must understand that since the government lacks legitimacy, they do not have the authority to issue any charter, whatsoever. 

Robi Das

International Human Rights Lawyer in exile.