On a cold November morning in The Hague, the President of the International Court of Justice read out a finding the world court had never made before. “The Republic of the Union of Myanmar has committed genocide against the Rohingya group in northern Rakhine State.” By nine votes to six, after seven years of litigation, a state had been found responsible for the crime of crimes.
Across the world, in the camps of Cox’s Bazar, people did not have to wait for the news to reach them. That morning, a big screen had been set up to carry the proceedings live, and refugees crowded behind a metal net to watch the judges in the Great Hall of Justice at the Peace Palace. Others followed on televisions and mobile phones, as the words were translated for the crowd. In Kutupalong and Balukhali, in Thangkhali, Hakimpara, Jamtoli and Moynarghona, in Chakmarkul, Unchiprang and Shamlapur, in Leda, Ali Khali, Nayapara and Jadimura, and out on the island of Bhasan Char, more than a million people heard the world name what had been done to them.
Mohammed Osman, whose parents and four siblings were killed by the Myanmar military, said the verdict proved “we were not lying about the genocide.”
For the Rohingya, this judgment is more than a legal finding. For decades Myanmar has denied that they exist as a people, calling them “Bengalis”, illegal migrants in their own land. The world court treated them as what they are, a distinct ethnic group, protected by the Genocide Convention. That affirmation of identity has come from no less a place than the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. And it is a recognition, at last, of a genocide that generations of Rohingya have suffered, from the grandparents who fled in 1978 to the parents who fled in 1992 and the children who fled in 2017.
Two laureates
It is worth remembering who once stood in that same Great Hall to deny all this. In December 2019, Aung San Suu Kyi, Nobel Peace laureate of 1991, the woman who had spent some fifteen years under house arrest for defying the generals, flew to The Hague to defend them. She told the judges that The Gambia had presented “an incomplete and misleading factual picture” and denied any genocidal intent. In a speech of 3,379 words, she did not once use the word “Rohingya” to describe the people at the heart of the case. Her refusal to name them was the denial of identity in its purest form, and the halo of sainthood vanished in that courtroom. Simon Adams of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect called it the “final ignoble fall” of a Nobel laureate into a genocide denier. Today’s judgment is the verdict of history on that performance.
Bangladesh should not be too quick to feel superior. We, too, have had our Nobel Peace laureate in power, wrapped in a saintly image the world was eager to believe. In September 2024, weeks after Muhammad Yunus took office, the Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention issued a statement on Bangladesh warning of “ominous signs of genocidal intent towards the Awami League, towards Hindu Bangladeshis, and towards other religious minorities”. The US Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Early Warning Project ranked Bangladesh 13th of 168 countries for the risk of a new mass killing. How did the laureate respond? He called the attacks on Hindus “exaggerated” and “more political than communal”, and later dismissed much of the reporting as “propaganda and not based on facts“. His press wing went on to reclassify most incidents involving minorities in 2025 as “criminal in nature” rather than communal.
Deny the victims’ identity, recast targeted violence as something else, blame a foreign plot. The vocabulary is familiar to anyone who heard Suu Kyi in 2019. A Nobel medal is no vaccine against it. If anything, the saintly image is what lets the world look away for longer.
It is right that the spotlight falls on Myanmar. But this judgment should also make Bangladesh look in the mirror. The Rohingya did not first arrive on Bangladesh’s soil in 2017. They came in 1978. They came again in 1991 and 1992. Each time, a different government in Dhaka had to decide what kind of country we would be to people running from slaughter and genocide.
Three exoduses produced three very different answers. Two of those answers were written in hunger, gunfire and forced return. One was written in the decision to keep the border open. And behind the case that reached The Hague today lies a story of Bangladeshi support that has rarely been told.
The account of 1978 that follows owes much to the legal scholar M Sanjeeb Hossain of the University of Oslo. In “‘Doing’ Legal History in Refugee Law: A Snapshot of Bangladesh’s Engagement with Non-refoulement”, published in the Journal of Refugee Studies (2024), Hossain examined parliamentary archives, UNHCR correspondence and old newspapers, and interviewed people who were there. His conclusion is stark. Bangladesh, which upheld non-refoulement for more than a million Rohingya in 2017, did not do so after their mass displacements in the past.
This is that story.
The hungry camps of 1978
As Hossain recounts, in February 1978 the Burmese military launched Operation Naga Min, the “Dragon King”. Officially it was a census. In practice it was a campaign to screen, identify and expel those the state deemed foreigners. Within months more than 200,000 Rohingya had crossed into south-eastern Bangladesh.
Bangladesh was then ruled by General Ziaur Rahman, the Chief Martial Law Administrator who had made himself President. There was no parliament to debate the crisis. In public, his government protested Burma’s “repressive measures”. In private, it moved quickly to send the refugees back. A bilateral repatriation agreement was signed in July 1978, while the refugees were still huddled in monsoon-swamped camps along the Teknaf–Cox’s Bazar road.
What followed was recorded by the UN refugee agency’s own officials. Alan Lindquist, who headed UNHCR’s sub-office in Cox’s Bazar, reported a senior Bangladeshi official telling a meeting, “It is all very well to have fat, well-fed refugees. But I must be a politician, and we are not going to make the refugees so comfortable that they won’t go back to Burma.”
That was not idle talk. Food and basic assistance were withheld, even though, as later UNHCR evaluations found, there was no shortage. One UNHCR staff member put it bluntly. Government policy “had become one in fact of starving the refugees into leaving.” Refugees were attacked in the camps by Bangladeshi security personnel and officials.
The cost was counted in graves. On 26 January 1979, UNHCR announced in Geneva that more than 10,000 refugees had died in the camps since June 1978. By the end of March the toll had reached 12,000. What killed them depends on whom you ask. UNHCR’s own field staff blamed hunger. Lack of food, one of them concluded, “resulted in widespread malnutrition and death rates that were avoidable”. MSF later recorded that most of the dead were women and children, lost to severe malnutrition and illness after food rations were cut. Yet once the repatriation was over, in January 1980, UNHCR told the press that up to 10,000 had died and named epidemics as the principal cause. Malnutrition points to a policy; an epidemic points to misfortune. At its worst, the annual mortality rate in the camps was 17 per cent, eight and a half times the Bangladeshi average. Foreign journalists and diplomats had been kept out until American pressure forced the gates open.
By the end of 1979, around 187,000 Rohingya had been sent back to the country they had fled. A UNHCR evaluation, never published “due to its controversial nature”, later found it “highly questionable” whether the return was voluntary at all.
The BNP likes to tell a different story, that Zia stared Burma down by threatening to arm the refugees. Hossain examined the claim and found it inconclusive. Even if true, it explains only how Bangladesh secured Burma’s agreement to the returns, not whether the refugees returned freely. A BNP politician who served the area in 1978 told Hossain plainly, “Onek jor o korsi amra“, or “we also forced them at times.”
Gunfire at the camp gates, 1992
Thirteen years later, history repeated itself under a civilian government. In 1991 and 1992, forced labour, land seizures and violence by the Burmese military drove some 250,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh. This time the Prime Minister was Khaleda Zia, that same general’s widow.
In April 1992, Dhaka and Yangon signed a memorandum of understanding on return. The pushbacks began almost at once. By mid-May, UNHCR said it would not take part in returns under the conditions it was seeing. Late that month, the Bangladeshi government accused UNHCR and Médecins Sans Frontières of impeding repatriation, as if protecting refugees were the obstacle.
The organised returns began in September 1992. UNHCR joined in October, hoping to monitor them, and withdrew in December when it became clear that voluntariness was not being respected. In November and December 1992, 84 per cent of returns took place without UNHCR supervision. On the other side of the border, UNHCR had no presence in Burma at all, and no agreement to protect those who were sent back.
MSF’s records from that year read like a charge sheet. In May its volunteers witnessed violence against refugees in the camps. On 18 August an MSF nurse watched Bangladeshi police fire at refugees. On 7 December MSF issued a press release whose headline still shocks, “Bangladeshi soldiers kill Rohingya refugees demonstrating against forced repatriation.”
UNHCR eventually negotiated a framework and returned to the process, and repatriation continued into the mid-1990s. But the pattern of 1978 had been set again, a bilateral deal first, the refugees’ wishes last.
The open door of 2017
In August 2017 the Myanmar military launched the “clearance operations” that the ICJ has now found to be genocide. Around 10,000 people were killed, according to the Court, which relied on UN fact-finding estimates. Villages were systematically burned and resettled with non-Rohingya. More than 700,000 people fled into Bangladesh in a matter of weeks, one of the fastest refugee movements the world has seen.
This time Bangladesh, under the leadership of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, did not turn them away. It did not starve them out. It did not shoot at the camp gates. It opened the border. Sheikh Hasina said, “We have the ability to feed 160 million people of Bangladesh, and we have enough food security to feed the 700,000 refugees.” Set that sentence beside the words of the official in 1978, and you have the difference between two very different ideas of what a state owes people fleeing persecution.
Bangladesh has never signed the Refugee Convention (1951). Yet, as Hossain notes, in 2017 it upheld the principle of non-refoulement for more than a million people, when it had not done so in the past (Hossain, Journal of Refugee Studies, 2024). A non-signatory state lived up to the Convention’s core better than many signatories have.
That record is not spotless, and honesty requires saying so. Some boats carrying Rohingya refugees were indeed pushed back in 2012. Two attempts at repatriation, in November 2018 and August 2019, collapsed when refugees refused to go, and to the then Awami League government’s credit, no one was forced. The relocation of more than 30,000 refugees to the island of Bhasan Char drew serious criticism, including allegations of coercion. And as aid dwindled, the welcoming tone of 2017 hardened.
But the central fact stands. From 2017 to 2024, there was no mass forced return. Survivors of what the world court now calls genocide were not sent back to their killers. In 1978 and 1992 they were.
The spark in Dhaka, May 2018
The case that ended in The Hague today began, in a sense, in Dhaka.
In May 2018 Bangladesh hosted the 45th session of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation’s Council of Foreign Ministers. The Gambia’s foreign minister could not attend. In his place came the country’s Attorney General and Justice Minister, Abubacarr Marie Tambadou, a former prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Delegates were taken to the camps. Tambadou had sat with survivors of the Rwandan genocide; now he heard the same stories in Cox’s Bazar. Rwanda, he later said, had taught him to recognise what he was hearing. The Gambia chaired the OIC committee on accountability for the Rohingya. Tambadou returned home convinced that law, not only diplomacy, had to answer. In November 2019 The Gambia filed its case, on behalf of the OIC’s 57 members.
The Gambia was the face of the case. Bangladesh was much of its engine.
Dhaka paid. The Gambia, a country of 2.5 million people, needed money for international counsel. Bangladesh gave US$500,000 to the OIC fund set up for the case, making it the largest contributor, and its foreign minister went from capital to capital urging other OIC states to pay their share.
Dhaka opened its doors. It gave The Gambia’s team access and technical support; in December 2019 a Bangladeshi delegation went to The Hague offering government records on the refugees. It let UN investigators, the ICC and human rights organisations into the camps, where much of the survivor testimony that underpins today’s judgment was gathered.
And Dhaka carried the weight. Every witness statement, every piece of evidence about what happened in Rakhine, came from people Bangladesh had chosen to shelter rather than expel. Had 2017 gone the way of 1978, there would have been no witnesses left to testify.
Outside the courtroom
Why, then, was Bangladesh not a party in The Hague?
Part of the answer lies in a single line written in 1998. When Bangladesh acceded to the Genocide Convention (1948), it declared that any dispute under Article IX, the clause providing for the Court’s jurisdiction, would require “the consent of all parties to the dispute” in each case. In plain terms, Bangladesh could not take Myanmar to court without Myanmar’s agreement, and Myanmar was never going to agree. In 2023 the Court confirmed the bite of such a reservation when it refused a similar intervention by the United States in Ukraine v Russia.
The rest of the answer is diplomacy. Dhaka was negotiating returns with Myanmar and managing a volatile border. China, Myanmar’s chief protector, is also one of Bangladesh’s most important partners. A neighbour in the dock is a very different thing from a distant state acting for the common good.
There was also a quieter legal logic. Myanmar argued that The Gambia’s standing was merely “ancillary” to Bangladesh’s, as if only the directly affected neighbour could complain. In 2022 the Court rejected that, holding that every party to the Genocide Convention shares an interest in its observance. A case brought by a distant state on behalf of the whole OIC was harder to dismiss as a bilateral quarrel. That in itself was another victory for international justice.
The years of the interim government that followed August 2024 told their own story. There were promises, notably the Chief Adviser’s prayer in March 2025 that the Rohingya would celebrate the next Eid in their homes in Myanmar. A cruel promise! No one went home that year, or the year after. The window for Bangladesh to apply to intervene to protect its own legal interests at the ICJ closed when Myanmar filed its final written pleading on 23 December 2024, and it closed unused. Meanwhile the camps became recruiting grounds for armed groups, and more than 100,000 new refugees arrived.
The rule that binds us all
There is a French word at the heart of this story, refoulement, the act of forcing a refugee back to danger. The prohibition on it, non-refoulement, is the cornerstone of refugee protection. It appears in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention (1951), in Article 3 of the Convention against Torture (1984), and in the rights to life and freedom from torture under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). Bangladesh is party to the latter two. Most scholars hold that the rule is also customary international law, binding every state whether it has signed the Refugee Convention or not.
Refoulement need not involve a soldier at a border. Making life so unbearable that people “choose” to leave is refoulement too. That is what the hungry camps of 1978 were. The pushbacks and gunfire of 1992 were the cruder version.
Today’s judgment changes the moral arithmetic for good. The world court has found that the Rohingya fled genocide. It has ordered Myanmar to create the conditions for their safe and voluntary return, to restore their property, to search for the disappeared and to pay compensation, and to report back within two years. The key word is voluntary. Any Bangladeshi government that pushed these refugees back now would be returning survivors of a judicially established genocide to the state found responsible for it.
Enforcement will be hard. The ICJ has no policing mechanism. If Myanmar ignores the Court, The Gambia can take the matter to the Security Council under Article 94(2) of the UN Charter (1945), where the matter is likely to face a veto from Russia and China. But the judgment will outlast any veto, and it strengthens the ICC and Argentine cases, including the arrest warrants Argentina has issued for 25 individuals accused of giving the orders in Myanmar.
For Bangladesh, the lesson of three exoduses is simple. In 1978 and 1992, we treated the Rohingya as a problem to be removed. In 2017, we treated them as people to be protected, and that choice is why there were survivors to testify in The Hague. As the compliance phase begins, the question for Dhaka is which of those traditions it intends to carry forward.
On 19 November 2026 the world court told the truth about what was done to the Rohingya. The least we owe them is to remember, honestly, what we did too.
In 1978, Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister told the UN General Assembly that the repatriation agreement reflected the “statesmanship” of the region’s leaders. Years later, a confidential UNHCR report hailed the operation as “a singular landmark in the UNHCR quest for durable solutions”. Ten thousand graves in Cox’s Bazar tell a different story. Diplomacy, it seems, works in mysterious ways!
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AI Usage Disclosure: During the preparation of this work, the author used artificial intelligence tools to assist with research, the organisation of background information, and the grammatical and stylistic refinement of the draft. These tools included Claude, ChatGPT, Gemini, and Grammarly. The author has independently reviewed the factual claims, data, references, and citations and taken reasonable steps to verify their accuracy. The research, interpretive analysis, arguments, and conclusions are entirely the author’s own. The author has reviewed and edited all AI-assisted outputs to ensure that they reflect his own voice and judgement and accepts full responsibility and accountability for the final content.

Dr Rayhan Rashid is a Senior Consultant at Oxford Matrix and Founder and Trustee of the International Crimes Strategy Forum (ICSF), an independent global network working to end impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and terrorism, and to secure justice for their victims.
