From the complainant’s lawyer to the expert witness, the International Crimes Tribunal’s (ICT’s) prosecution is riddled with conflicts of interest. These conflicts were brought to its attention but never addressed. The International Criminal Court (ICC), which the ICT itself looks to for guidance, disqualified its own Prosecutor on considerably less.
On 20 August 2024, a Supreme Court lawyer named Gazi Tamim filed a complaint with the Investigation Agency of the International Crimes Tribunal on behalf of Hefazat-e-Islam leader Mufti Harun Izhar. The complaint named several individuals and accused them of genocide and crimes against humanity in connection with the events of 5 May 2013 at Shapla Chattar. Eighteen days later, on 7 September 2024, a gazette notification appointed Mr Tamim as a Prosecutor of the same Tribunal. He has since helped prosecute the very case that originated from his complaint.
There is a Latin principle, nemo iudex in causa sua. In English, it means that no one should be a judge in their own cause. It began as a rule governing judges, but the principle behind it is wider. Wherever the law gives someone power over another person’s fate, it requires them to have no stake in the outcome. Today, we call such a stake a conflict of interest. A prosecutor does not deliver the verdict. They do, however, decide who will stand in the dock, what charges they will face and what evidence the court will see. International criminal law, which governs this case, insists that prosecutors, too, must be impartial and must be seen to be so. The United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (1990) require prosecutors to act impartially and objectively. Without such impartiality, the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) would be meaningless.
Before going further, I should disclose where I stand. I act for three of the accused, Dr Dipu Moni, Hasanul Haq Inu and Shahriar Kabir, in ICT-BD Case No. 5 of 2026, officially known as the Shapla Chattar case. I also informally advise the legal teams of two other accused in the same case. The facts set out below are drawn from the public record, and readers are free to examine them for themselves.
Consider how seriously the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague takes conflicts of interest. In 2018, Karim Khan KC, then a barrister in private practice, acted pro bono for a group of alleged victims in the Philippines, submitting an Article 15 communication asking the ICC to investigate the so-called war on drugs waged by President Rodrigo Duterte. He also worked with individuals who later became prosecution witnesses, including in an investigative capacity. On 16 June 2021, Mr Khan was sworn in as Prosecutor of that same Court. In 2025, during the proceedings against Mr Duterte in The Hague, Mr Duterte’s lawyers asked the ICC to disqualify Mr Khan from the case, citing a conflict of interest.
Mr Khan had reasonable grounds to defend his position. He had disclosed his earlier role to the Pre-Trial Chamber, stayed out of the evidential review for the arrest warrant application and, by then, had been on leave from the Court for several months. Even so, on 2 October 2025, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC disqualified him in a unanimous decision. Actual bias had not been established, nor did it need to be. The test, drawn from the Bemba and Gaddafi cases, was whether a reasonable observer, properly informed, would apprehend a lack of impartiality. The Chamber found that Mr Khan’s earlier involvement had been “significantly intense and multifaceted”, and directed at Mr Duterte personally. It considered that he could reasonably be expected to have formed an opinion on Mr Duterte’s criminal responsibility. That was enough to disqualify him.
The legal basis was Article 42(7) of the Rome Statute (1998). It bars a Prosecutor from participating in any matter in which their impartiality might reasonably be doubted. One ground is expressly identified: previous involvement “in any capacity in that case”. Rule 34(1) of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence (2002) adds further grounds. Two are particularly relevant here. Rule 34(1)(c) covers work undertaken before taking office that could lead the person to form an opinion on the case. Rule 34(1)(d) covers opinions expressed in the media, in writing or through public actions, that could objectively affect their impartiality. Rule 35 goes further still: it requires a Prosecutor who becomes aware of such a ground to request to be excused, without waiting to be challenged.
The Chamber’s reasoning offers two further lessons. First, it did not matter that no “case” existed when Mr Khan undertook his earlier work. The circumstances giving rise to an appearance of bias need not arise at the case stage. Second, the Chamber made clear that disqualification is not automatic. Each application must be assessed on its own facts. A general fact-finding exercise, not directed at establishing any individual’s guilt, is treated differently. The test is demanding, but it is not mechanical.
What does this have to do with Bangladesh or the ICT? The Tribunal has answered that question itself. In its judgment of 30 June 2026 in the July uprising case against Mr Hasanul Haq Inu, it stated that it “derives persuasive interpretative guidance” from the Rome Statute and the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals. The ICT operates under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act (1973), but it has chosen, by its own declaration, to measure itself against the standards applied in The Hague. It is only fair, then, to hold it to those standards.
Against this background, consider Mr Tamim’s position. The complainant he represented was Mufti Harun Izhar Chowdhury, a Joint Secretary General of Hefazat-e-Islam. Among those named in the complaint was my client, Shahriar Kabir. On the day he filed it, Mr Tamim told the press that the Investigation Agency had accepted the complaint. On 5 May 2025, by then a Prosecutor, he told the state news agency BSS that the Investigation Agency had “primarily found the truth of the complaints”, even though the investigation was still under way. A public statement of this kind, made while an investigation is pending, is precisely the sort of conduct that Rule 34(1)(d) addresses. On 5 February 2026, he asked the Tribunal for a further two months to complete the investigation in this very case. As the investigation proceeded, the case expanded. My other clients Hasanul Haq Inu and Dr Dipu Moni, neither of whom had been named in the original complaint, were also named in the Formal Charge submitted on 27 July 2026. The complainant’s former lawyer had thus become a Prosecutor in the very case in which the list of accused continued to grow.
One might argue that Mr Tamim was a Prosecutor, not an investigator, and therefore had no responsibility for deciding who was charged. But the ICT operates differently. Under section 8(2) of the ICT Act, a Prosecutor may also act as an Investigation Officer. Under Rule 9(1) of the Rules of Procedure, arrest warrants during an investigation are obtained “through the prosecution”. Rule 9(2) expressly contemplates a Prosecutor conducting the investigation. An investigation cannot be stopped without the Chief Prosecutor’s agreement (Rule 7). Under Rule 18(1A), the Chief Prosecutor decides which offences and which accused are included in the formal charge. Rule 18(2)(a) requires the Investigation Agency to assist the Prosecutors in framing it. The prosecution does not simply wait for an investigation to conclude and receive its findings. It helps shape them. The prosecution may point to Rule 3(1), which assigns the investigation to the Investigation Agency. That rule, however, allocates a task; it does not separate the investigation from the prosecution. In this respect, the ICT prosecution resembles the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor, which is responsible for both investigating and prosecuting. As a Prosecutor in this case, Mr Tamim was in a position to influence both the investigation and the prosecutorial decisions that followed.
Place Mr Tamim alongside Mr Khan, and the comparison is uncomfortable. Mr Khan assisted alleged victims pro bono, whereas Mr Tamim was formally engaged as the complainant’s lawyer and personally filed the complaint. Like Mr Khan’s communication, the complaint was not a general fact-finding exercise: it named specific individuals. Mr Khan’s involvement came three years before he assumed office, when no case yet existed. Mr Tamim’s, by contrast, came just eighteen days before his appointment as a Prosecutor of this very Tribunal, in this very case. This falls squarely within the language of Article 42(7): involvement “in any capacity in that case”. Mr Khan disclosed his earlier role and stayed away from key stages of the proceedings. Mr Tamim has never disclosed his, nor has he sought to be excused. Indeed, the material disclosed to the defence makes no mention of his earlier role and does not identify Mufti Harun Izhar, his own former client, as the complainant. If Mr Khan’s position gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, it is difficult to see how Mr Tamim’s does not. Nor is the applicable standard unfamiliar to him. He is listed as a Prosecutor in Mr Inu’s July uprising case, where the defence had already drawn the Tribunal’s attention to the conflict of interest, relying on Article 42(7) and the Duterte decision.
To understand how this came about, we need to look at the top of the prosecution. Advocate Tajul Islam, the former Chief Prosecutor, was appointed to that office on 7 September 2024, the same day as Mr Tamim. For more than a decade before that, he had appeared before the same Tribunal as defence counsel for senior leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami. Until shortly before his appointment, he was a joint convener of the Amar Bangladesh (AB) Party. During the July 2024 protests, the AB Party formed a team to provide legal aid to students protesting for quota reform. Mr Tajul Islam led the team in his capacity as the party’s member secretary, as Mujibur Rahman Manju told Dhaka Post on the day of his appointment. Mr Tajul Islam’s own Facebook posts from that period point in the same direction. Both bring Rule 34(1)(c) and (d) into play. His involvement with the protesters was every bit as “significantly intense and multifaceted” as Mr Khan’s involvement with the alleged victims of Duterte’s war on drugs. Weeks later, he became Chief Prosecutor, responsible for prosecuting those accused of crimes against the same protesters. For most of the investigation in this case, he held the office that, under Rule 18(1A), determines who is charged and with what. The conflict therefore lay at the very point where the most consequential decisions were made.
This is the Duterte problem in its clearest form. A lawyer stood with one side and then took charge of the case against the other. In Mr Inu’s July uprising case, the defence put this very argument to the Tribunal, first in the discharge petition and again in the petition for review, relying on the Duterte decision. The Tribunal did not engage with the submission. That silence is particularly striking because the Tribunal had confronted the question before. In April 2025, its own chairman asked a newly appointed Prosecutor, himself a former defence counsel, what would happen if a conflict of interest arose. Mr Tajul Islam’s answer, as reported by The Daily Star, was that moving between sides in different cases was “not a big issue”, but that representing one side and then the other in the same case would constitute a conflict. That is a much narrower test than the one applied at The Hague. Even on its own terms, however, it does not help him. In Duterte, there was no case when Mr Khan undertook his earlier work, yet the Appeals Chamber did not consider that an obstacle. Mr Tajul Islam’s answer nevertheless showed that he understood the principle. There is, however, no indication that it was ever applied to his own office.
The pattern extends further down the prosecution. Tanvir Hasan Zoha was appointed a Prosecutor of the Tribunal in October 2024. In Mr Inu’s July uprising case, he was subsequently named as a Prosecution Witness, to give evidence as a digital forensic expert on recordings relied upon by the prosecution. An expert witness owes a duty to the court, not to either party. The value of their evidence lies precisely in their independence. As The Ikarian Reefer [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68 makes clear, expert evidence must be, and be seen to be, independent of the demands of litigation. A Prosecutor of the same Tribunal, called as an expert witness by his own side, cannot offer that independence, however able he may be. The defence raised this objection before the Tribunal in Mr Inu’s case. The Tribunal did not address it.
The problem extends beyond Bangladesh. A British barrister served as special adviser to the Chief Prosecutor. He has said that, long before his appointment, he was part of a team that called on the US and the UK to impose sanctions on the Rapid Action Battalion, some of whose senior members are now being prosecuted before the ICT. Two other British barristers were appointed as advisers to the Chief Prosecutor. They, too, had been politically active on social media for years, expressing views openly critical of the Awami League and supportive of the July movement. Of course, holding political views does not, in itself, disqualify anyone. But a prosecution that draws its advisers from one side of a deep political divide cannot be surprised when its neutrality is questioned. A Chief Prosecutor who appoints such advisers must answer for the appearance they create.
None of these conflicts can be explained away. Each, on its own, goes to the heart of the prosecution’s impartiality. Taken together, they point to something more troubling: a pattern. A complainant’s lawyer became a Prosecutor in the same case and never disclosed his earlier role. A Chief Prosecutor stood with the protesters before prosecuting their opponents. A Prosecutor was named as an expert witness for the prosecution. And the prosecution brought in advisers whose political positions were well known long before their appointments. In each instance, the potential conflict called for examination. Where the defence raised objections, the Tribunal did not engage with them.
The importance of conflicts of interest extends well beyond this case and the fate of my clients. The families of those who died in May 2013 and July 2024 are entitled to the truth, established through a process that the whole country can accept. In R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, Lord Hewart CJ famously said that justice “should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done”. The modern English test, set out in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, asks whether a fair-minded and informed observer would see a real possibility of bias. The Hague applies much the same principle. A tribunal that asks the world to accept its verdicts must first be willing to scrutinise those who bring cases before it.
In the Shapla Chattar case, that scrutiny is overdue. My clients will seek to be discharged under Rule 46A(1), which preserves the Tribunal’s inherent power to prevent an abuse of process, and will advance a number of grounds in support of that application. Among other things, they will submit that an investigation shaped by a Prosecutor whose impartiality is reasonably in doubt cannot safely be treated as impartial. In the alternative, they will ask the Tribunal to direct that Mr Tamim take no further part in the proceedings and that the prosecution disclose the full extent of his involvement in the investigation and the formal charge. That alternative, at least, is a modest request. How the Tribunal responds will tell us a great deal about the kind of institution it intends to be.

Dr Rayhan Rashid is a Senior Consultant at Oxford Matrix and Founder and Trustee of the International Crimes Strategy Forum (ICSF), an independent global network working to end impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and terrorism, and to secure justice for their victims.
